“Multilateralism cursed by bilateralism: Japan’s Role at the International Whaling Commission”

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March 2009

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 0904

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE
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http://www.middlebury.edu/~econ
MULTIPLATFORMISM CURSED BY BILATERALISM: JAPAN’S ROLE AT THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION

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Abstract: We propose a new categorization of international organizations to account for the fact that within multilateral international organizations, states may engage in “enticement” strategies in order to advance their policy preferences. Thus, to the traditional multilateral/bilateral categorizations we substitute a hard multilateral/soft multilateral and reciprocal bilateral/bilateral taxonomy. For illustration purposes, we use the well-known case study of Japan and the International Whaling Commission (IWC). Using a modified gravity model to analyze Japan’s Official Development Assistance from 1973-2005, we find that Japan has a very traditional – and generous – assistance policy broadly defined, but when it comes to the IWC, some of the general principles driving the aid policy are put aside to possibly influence vote outcomes. Given this finding, we conclude that the IWC is best categorized as a soft multilateral organization.

Keywords:

International organizations, opportunism, rent-seeking, foreign aid

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1. Introduction

The paper addresses the question of whether multilateralism can be cursed by bilateralism in the context of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Multilateralism is used to provide every member with the same level of information, and involve everybody – possibly equally – in the decision process. In what follows, we will propose a different categorization of international organizations: to the usual multilateral/bilateral scheme, we will substitute hard multilateral/soft multilateral and reciprocal bilateral/bilateral. For illustration purposes, we will use the well-known case study of the International Whaling Commission (IWC). The IWC is an interesting institution to study in the sense that there is only one mandate: whaling or not. Minutes and observations are solely focused on the IWC’s only role. There are no other mandates that could create noise in the analysis. The literature studying international organizations often points the use of bilateral foreign aid by Japan to influence votes at the IWC. This paper neither puts the blame on Japan more than on any other country, nor concludes that Japan’s foreign aid is only driven by bilateral considerations, which is untrue. Rather, our study shows that even though, Japan as a “leader” may want to influence the vote outcomes within the walls of the IWC, it still considers the economic situation of the countries to which it allocates its foreign aid. Moreover, Japan is certainly not the only country using its influence to obtain favorable votes.

When compared to the United Nations or World Trade Organization, the IWC does not rank as major player in the global political economy. Even within environmental regimes, the IWC does not play a prominent role in international policy. Nevertheless, the IWC has attracted more than its fair share of attention due to allegations against Japan for trying to overturn the commercial whaling ban passed by the commission with member recruitment and vote buying. Being lodged primarily by the media and environmental non-governmental organizations, these accusations have been given little attention by the academic community. Notwithstanding even the political salience of the issue, this makes sense; relative to other highly influential intergovernmental organizations, the IWC seems rather irrelevant. However, given the splash made by “How Much is a Seat on Security Council Worth?” (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006), which captures vote buying within the U.N. Security Council, we should view the IWC as the perfect arena for expanding the study of “enticement” strategies within intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Its story, one of alleged member recruitment and vote buying, has large implications for research in international relations (IR).

That “enticement” strategies take place within the U.N. Security Council should, in and of itself, give IR scholars pause. We argue, and the data confirm, that IR should include within its theoretical folds the influence of reciprocal
bilateralism on multilateralism. In the context of IGO’s this would be known as the “curse of bilateralism.” Since there are over 5,000 IGOs in the international system nowadays, the possibility of bribery within more than two of them should not be a long stretch of the imagination. This would help scholars characterize a new group of ‘soft multilateral organizations’ [i.e. including a degree of reciprocal-bilateralism]. Furthermore, given that in the case of the IWC Japan is not bound by membership and could simply leave the organization to circumvent the whaling ban, an interesting dynamic in state-IGO relationships emerges. Perhaps states are working within IOs to an increasing extent to affect change, and using enticement strategies as a tool. This potential necessitates a rethinking of the traditional classification of international organizations to account for such behavior.

Our categorization is as follows:

- Multilateralism
  - Hard multilateralism: used to provide every member with the same level of information, and involve everybody – possibly equally – in the decision process. It is resistant to reciprocal bilateralism i.e. enticement strategies and rent seeking. An example might be the International Committee for Weights and Measures.
  - Soft multilateralism: Multilateralism that includes a degree of reciprocal bilateralism. An example is the International Whaling Commission where foreign aid is used as an enticement strategy to advance the policy positions of certain states.

- Bilateralism
  - Reciprocal bilateralism: Reciprocal bilateralism includes cases of quid pro quo arrangements between two states, e.g. increased aid for voting a certain way on the U.N. security council or in the IWC.
  - Bilateralism: bilateralism is a direct relationship between two countries, a donor and a recipient, with no reciprocity for the donor.

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3 This can be thought of as behavior that might be explained by any of the dominant IR paradigms, namely neo-realism, or neo-liberalism. This paper does not, however, make an argument as to the validity of any of these general theories.

4 This question, though interesting, is out of the purview of this paper. However, according to Ishii (2009) Japan’s continued membership in the IWC is a result of the perceived costs of withdrawal on other Japanese fishing interests.
2. Aid, UN Security Council Seats, and Vote Buying at the IWC: Towards a New Categorization of IGOs.

Intergovernmental organizations have varied membership rules, and these rules are particularly important with respect to ‘soft multilateralism.’ In open membership organizations within which a country can join or exit at its pleasure (e.g. the IWC), soft-multilateralism may be a function of either member-recruitment (which Japan is accused of), or vote buying. In closed membership organizations (e.g. the WTO and EU) new members, whose terms of membership may or may not be fixed, must be approved by existing members. We hypothesize that soft multilateralism under closed membership rules is a function of vote buying alone. We base this on the assumption that member recruitment cum targeted vote buying for approval of a new member would be prohibitively less preferable than vote buying on a given issue of interest per se.

The attempt by scholars to uncover cases in which states use foreign aid opportunistically in intergovernmental organizations is not unprecedented, and “How Much is a Seat on the UN Security Council Worth?” exemplifies such inquiries. In this case, the findings are as compelling as the allegation of “bribery” itself. Kuziemko and Werker (2006) find an average 59 percent increase to new rotating members from U.S., though the authors note that a rotating member’s willingness to trade influence on the council for financial favors is one of two incentives countries have to fight for a Security Council seat. (The other incentive is a greater and more meaningful participation in the decision-making process of the UN on global security issues). The authors conclude that “[the] timing effect of aid increases to rotating members closely tracks a country’s election to and exit from the council,” and that the effect “[increases] during years in which key diplomatic events take place (when members votes should be especially valuable),” (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006).

Being a special case of closed membership, the discontinuous nature of rotating membership on the Security Council is highly advantageous for empirical identification of state engagement in enticement strategies. Nevertheless, the vast majority of IGOs do not have such membership rules. Relative to the rotating membership case, empirical identification of the relationship between membership, voting, and financial flows, is more difficult in closed-membership IGOs, and most difficult in open-membership IGOs. In the former case, variation in membership takes place only when a country goes from non-member to member, but voting patterns and financial flows—the
relationship of interest—is isolated from any membership effect. In the latter case, variation in membership can take place when a country goes from non-member to member or from member to non-member. This is advantageous in terms of capturing the relationship between financial flows and membership (i.e. member recruitment), but because membership and voting patterns are not independent, the two are likely to be conflated in empirical tests of “vote buying.” Miller and Dolšak (2007), for example, avoid conflating membership status and voting because they look at the voting records of select IWC members from 1999-2004. Importantly, they find that Japanese foreign aid, Official Development Assistance (ODA), is positively associated with votes cast at the IWC by a given country in the previous year. However, the picture they capture is only half of the story, because the allegations against Japan are for both member-recruitment and vote buying.

Thus, the full question is whether Japan uses aid as a carrot for new member-states to join the IWC, and then, depending upon how a country votes in subsequent years, increases or decreases the size of the carrot. To help answer this question Strand et al. (2008), examine a panel of 29 Latin American and Caribbean islands using a model that allows them to capture the effect of both membership and voting on aid; interestingly, find that membership and voting patterns do have a significant effect on aid, but that Japan has not used aid to buy votes from newly recruited IWC members. As their paper captures only one region (the key region of speculation about recruitment and vote buying), they suggest that future research should look outside the region to ascertain broadly, the effect of IWC membership and voting on Japan’s worldwide aid policy. Our paper does just this in order to categorize the IWC as a hard multilateral or soft multilateral organization. Before we present our model (and results), however, we must turn briefly to an issue neglected thus far: why the controversy at the IWC exists in the first place.

3. To Whale, or Not to Whale?

The International Whaling Commission was created in 1946 to regulate several aspects of commercial whaling, including setting seasons for whaling, establishing territories within which whaling is permissible, setting limits on the number of whales which can be caught, and setting regulations on the kinds of species which may be whaled. In 1986, the IWC passed a complete moratorium on commercial whaling:

5 See IWC History and Purpose [online]: http://www.iwcoffice.org/commission/iwcmain.htm#history
“Notwithstanding the other provisions of paragraph 10, catch limits for the killing for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the 1986 coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero. This provision will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990 at the latest the Commission will undertake a comprehensive assessment of the effects of this decision on whale stocks and consider modification of this provision and the establishment of other catch limits.”

Lobbied for by the U.S., a group of pro-conservation states, and several environmental NGO’s, (allegedly with enticement strategies), the moratorium smacked of “cultural imperialism” to pro-whaling nations. Most notable of these pro-whaling nations is Japan. While under current rules Japan is allowed to whale on a small-scale via scientific permits, it cannot do so under objection to the schedule, as it withdrew its objection to the moratorium in 1993. (From 1986 to 1993 Japan caught 11,295 minke whales and 634 byrdes whales under objection). Since 1993, Japan has been accused of trying to overturn the commercial whaling ban via a campaign of member recruitment and vote buying. Indeed, a vote in favor of commercial whaling at the IWC is the only way Japan can return to large-scale whaling practices. Notwithstanding this well-known reality, Japan has been less than unambiguous in its public response to the allegations of impropriety lodged against it. On the one hand, a Japanese Fisheries Minister deflected the accusations as absurd given the magnitude of Japan’s ODA program:

“Japan gives development aid to more than 150 countries. The IWC has just over 40 members. Among them are several—India and Argentina, for

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6 Miller and Dolsak, 2007.
7 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom. (See Miller and Dolsak, 2007: 74)
8 See Miller and Dolsak, 2007: 70
9 Other pro-whaling nations are Antigua & Barbuda, Benin, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominica, Gabon, Grenada, Guinea, Iceland, Kiribati, Korea, Mali, Marshall Island, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nauru, Nicaragua, Norway, Palau, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands, Suriname, and Tuvalu. Ibid, 78
10 Additionally, Japan has been unable to procure aboriginal whaling permits for the take of 50 minke whales by coastal whaling communities. Like scientific permit whaling and whaling under objection, aboriginal whaling is the third type of permissible whaling. While the IWC has issued aboriginal whaling permits to the U.S., Denmark, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the Russian Federation, it has continually blocked aboriginal permits for Japan. Ibid., 75.
11 Interestingly, whaling falls under this category for etymological reasons: Kujira and Isana, the latter meaning “brave fish,” are the two Japanese translations for “whale.” Ibid., 70.
example—which receive huge amounts of Japanese aid. But they never vote with us...”11

On the other, a speech made in 2001 by Masayuki Komatsu, Japan’s Alternate Commissioner to the IWC, seemed to indicate a mea culpa:

“Japan does not have a military power. Unlike U.S. and Australia, you may dispatch your military power to East Timor. That is not the case of Japan. Japanese means is simply diplomatic communication and ODAs. So, in order to get appreciation of Japan’s position, of course you know that it is natural that we must do, resort to those two major tools. So, I think there is nothing wrong.”12

Into this fray of allegations (and denials) of recruitment and vote buying at the IWC, enter IPE scholarship. Our paper, like Miller and Dolšak (2007) and Strand et al (2008), aims to negate, qualify, or support the case brought against Japan by the anti-whalers. It differs from Miller and Dolšak (2007) and Strand et al. (2008) in one key way, however. Our panel includes all countries to which Japan has given aid from 1973-2005. Accordingly, aid recipients include countries that were always members of the IWC, countries that joined (and/or resigned) between 1973 and 2005, and countries that never joined. These data allow us to capture the effect of both membership and voting at the commission on Japan’s foreign aid policy.

4. ModelinG Aid Flows: To Whom Does Japan Give Foreign Aid and Why?

One of the major complexities of studying Japan’s policy of foreign aid is the sheer magnitude of the Japanese Official Development Assistance program: from 1990 to 2000, for example, Japan was the world’s largest donor. Although the program has been scaled back by 10 percent per annum from 2000 onward, in absolute terms, Japan still ranks among the top three donors of aid along with the United States and European Union. Soderberg (2002) provides important details on three major phases of Japan’s ODA policy: (1) the period before 1973 during which aid was linked to trade and commercial motivations; (2) the period between the late 1970s and 1992 when ODA was driven by humanitarian concerns; and (3) the period after the ‘ODA Charter’13 was signed

11 Miller and Dolsak, 2007: 72

12 The Third Millennium Foundation, 2007: 7

13 This charter was signed after Japan’s ODA had become increasingly politicized, both in the domestic and international contexts (see Gagan, 2003).
and aid policy became focused on environmental protection, democratization, and market liberalization (Soderberg, 2002: 1-5). Alesina and Dollar (2000) also provide insight into Japan’s motivations for donating aid and find, among other things, that a history of voting with Japan at the U.N. is significant and positive with respect to aid flows (Alesina and Dollar, 2000: 43). This is a particularly reassuring result given the findings of Kuziekmo and Werker (2006).

For this study, we propose an empirical analysis inspired by the gravity model of international trade. However, a pure gravity model would require a pair-based analysis in a log-log format. In our study, we will use a cross-sectional time-series analysis with the FGLS estimator, using some variables coming from the gravity literature, such as distance.

Our dataset is composed of aggregate annual foreign aid received by the countries from Japan. We consider 169 countries to which Japan provides foreign aid. The data cover the period from 1973 to 2005, yielding a total sample of \( n=169 \times 33=5577 \) bilateral observations. Since the dataset includes missing observations, the actual dataset is smaller and unbalanced.

We will also estimate our model using interaction variables. IWC is a dummy variable that takes a value of zero for every year when countries are not IWC members, and one from when countries are IWC members. For countries that are not yet IWC members the value will be zero for the whole sample. This approach will make us able to use these countries as a de facto control group, an approach that will be reinforced by the interaction variables. Moreover we interact this dummy variable with the variables representing political regime, GDP per capita, Debt per capita, Distance. This helps us isolate whether being an IWC member matters or not compared to not being a member, while using the exogenous variables we specified.

Given the longitudinal nature of data, a simple OLS estimate of our model imposes strict restrictions that might not be justifiable given the complicated nature of our dataset. Specifically, we expect both temporally dependent interactions as well as interactions between countries that contradict OLS

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15 Note that 14 cross-sections are missing in the dataset. Therefore, \( N=168 \), and \( n=2016 \). However after accounting for missing data, our final sample is 1127.
assumptions. The presence of serial correlation and panel heteroskedasticity were of key concern in our estimation of this the model.

A way to check for autocorrelation is to use Baltagi and Wu (1999)’s LBI test or a modified Durbin-Watson test for unequally spaced panel data (Bhargava et al. (1982). If there is autocorrelation, the option would be fourfold: (1) a dynamic panel model (two-way random effect model or error-component model) with first differences, sometimes known as a Prais-Winston transformation or a Cochrane-Orcutt transformation; (2) a dynamic model with lagged dependent variables with two slightly different approaches known as one or two step general methods of moments (GMM) estimators as in Arellano and Bond (1991) or Arellano and Bover (1995)16; (3) a weight-adjusted combination of the White and Newey-West estimator to handle both the heteroskedasticity and the autocorrelation in the model; or (4) a feasible generalized least squares procedure (FGLS, or a two-state generalized least squares model) as in Parks (1967) and Kmenta (1997) in which the model assumes an autoregressive error structure of the first order AR(1), along with contemporaneous correlation among cross-sections.

The initial set of OLS estimates was subject to several tests to determine the interaction between observations. The assumption of zero autocorrelation was rejected by the Baltagi and Wu (1999)’s LBI test, while the modified Bhargava et al. (1982) Durbin-Watson proved inconclusive for positive serial correlation. Therefore the fourth option above was chosen. The model was estimated using the *cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and time-wise autoregressive model* (Kmenta 1997). Unlike pooled OLS estimation, the Kmenta-Parks method employed here accounts for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation when present.17

The Kmenta-Parks model is slightly modified. When T<N (here T=12 and N=168) the following assumption is necessary: \( E(\epsilon_{ijt}, \epsilon_{ijt}) = 0 \), thereby removing the assumption of contemporaneous correlation among cross-sections.

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16 GMM is usually robust to deviations of the underlying data generation process to violations of heteroskedasticity and normality, insofar as they are asymptotically normal, but they are not always the most efficient estimators.
17 First, OLS is used to obtain the regression residuals, which are then used to obtain a transformation that has an asymptotically non-autoregressive and homoskedastic error term. The other characteristics if the general Kmenta-Parks model are as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
E(\epsilon_{it}) &= \sigma_{it}^2 \text{ (heteroskedasticity)} \\
E(\epsilon_{it}, \epsilon_{jt}) &= 0 \text{ (where } i \neq j \text{ denotes cross-sectional independence)} \\
\epsilon_{it} &= \mu_{it} + \nu_{it} \\
\mu_{it} &\sim N(0, \sigma_{\mu}^2) \\
\nu_{it} &\sim N(0, \sigma_{\nu}^2) \\
E(\epsilon_{it}, \mu_{it}) &= 0 \forall \ y, ji
\end{align*}
\]
While our choice of estimation method is not immune to criticism, such as those found in Beck and Katz (1995), the modified FGLS estimates perform best because of our concern for autocorrelation. One of the main criticisms of the Kmenta-Parks estimates is the possibility of underestimation of standard errors and consequently resulting in an artificially inflated statistical significance. Since the FGLS method could be employed either in a fixed effects or random effects framework depending up on the underlying behavior of cross-sectional heterogeneity, it is critical that an appropriate test be conducted before proceeding with the suitable estimation strategy.

\[
ODA_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_0 IWC_{affinity}^{i,t-1} + \beta_1 IWC_{affinity}^{i,t-2} + \beta_2 IWC_{affinity}^{i,t-3} + \beta_3 UN_{i,t-1} + \delta_0 POL_{i,t} + \delta_1 IWC^{years}_{i,t} + \delta_2 GDP_{i,t}^{capita} + \delta_3 Dist + \delta_4 Debt_{i,t}^{capita} + \gamma_0 POL_{i,t} \ast IWC_{i,t}^{member} + \gamma_1 GDP_{i,t}^{capita} \ast IWC_{i,t}^{member} + \gamma_2 Debt_{i,t}^{capita} \ast IWC_{i,t}^{member} + \varepsilon
\]  

(1)

The dependent variable is ODA (in dollars) per capita of the recipient country, which combines both grants and loans. These data come from the OECD.

The independent variables of interest are IWC membership (specified as both a dummy and a counter), and voting affinity with Japan at the IWC, which is a correlation between the votes of Japan and other IWC members for a given year. The membership and voting are from the IWC.

The variables which comprise the gravity portion of the model are as follows: Friendliness at the UN; Level of Democracy (recipient), labeled as “POL”; Distance between donor and recipient, labeled as “Dist.”; GDP per capita (recipient); and Debt per capita (recipient).

Friendliness at the UN is the correlation of votes between Japan and all relevant country pairs for a given year. These data are from the set compiled by Professor Erik Voeten. Level of democracy comes from the Freedom House index, which ranks countries using a discrete 1-7 scale with 1 being the most democratic and 7 the least. As in Alesina and Dollar (2000), we reverse the ordering of the index so that a 7 is the highest possible level of democracy, and 1 is the lowest. The distance between countries is in kilometers and comes from CEPII. GDP per capita is in constant 2000 US dollars. Debt per capita is long term debt, defined as debt with a maturity of greater than one year and consisting of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed debt. These data are measured in current US dollars and we divide long term debt by population to arrive at the debt per capita variable. GDP per capita, long term

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18 See Professor Voeten’s website [online] http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ev42/UNVoting.htm We do not include abstentions in our calculations.
19 Data available from Freedom House [online] www.freedomhouse.org
debt, and population data are all from the World Development Indicators database.\textsuperscript{20}

<table>
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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>z-value</th>
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<tr>
<td>IWC affinity (1 year lag)</td>
<td>-22.52</td>
<td>22.59</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>IWC affinity (2 year lag)</td>
<td>46.52</td>
<td>25.14</td>
<td>1.85*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWC affinity (3 year lag)</td>
<td>40.59</td>
<td>23.17</td>
<td>1.75*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN friendliness (1 year lag)</td>
<td>30.39</td>
<td>9.89</td>
<td>3.07***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Regime</td>
<td>19.51</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>6.17***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of years in IWC</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDG per capita (recipient)</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-2.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt per capita</td>
<td>202017.20</td>
<td>78669.71</td>
<td>2.57***</td>
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<th>Interaction Variables</th>
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<tr>
<td>Political Regime * IWC</td>
<td>-11.74</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>-2.56***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita * IWC</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt per capita * IWC</td>
<td>-228360.50</td>
<td>182627.40</td>
<td>-1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.530000</td>
<td>18.250000</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( n = 760 \)

* <.1 significance  
** <.05 significance  
*** <.01 significance

In Table 1, it is interesting to note that votes from the previous year do not seem to influence the foreign aid, when, however, a fidelity premium seems to be rewarded if countries have voted in line with Japan’s agenda in the past two and three years. U.N. friendliness seems also to be rewarded, this time even the previous year’s vote matters. This follows the findings of Alesina and Dollar (2000), However, longer fidelity does not seem to have positive marginal effects.

Japan does also consider traditional economic development variables. In other words, foreign aid is not driven solely by the IWC agenda. For instance, foreign aid rewards countries when they work at improving the democratization of their political regime (see Table 1, political regime variable). Also, the higher the debt, the higher the foreign aid; the most indebted countries are well considered by Japan for aid donations. Aid is also tied to traditional international trade factors such as distance where the closer a country is to a donor, the more likely it will receive foreign aid (see Table 1, Distance).

\textsuperscript{20} Data available from World Development Indicators online at http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/indicators
However, when a country is already a member of the IWC, political regime is significant and negative (Political Regime*IWC). Unlike the general case in which aid is tied to democracy rating, within the walls of the IWC, the more authoritarian the country is, the more likely it is to receive foreign aid. This is a very interesting fact, particularly when considered alongside debt per capita for countries in the IWC. Indeed, the level of debt is no longer a significant driver of aid for countries IWC members.

So what, if anything might we conclude from Japan’s aid program given these findings? Stepping back, it is still straightforward to see that Japan has a very traditional – and generous – assistance policy broadly defined. Yet, when it comes to the IWC, some of the principles driving Japan’s ODA program are put aside, possibly to help further Japan’s policy preferences through enticement strategies.

Given these findings, we suggest that the IWC is a soft multilateral organization with some degree of reciprocal bilateralism functioning within it. To illustrate the importance of distinguishing between hard and soft multilateralism within the traditional multilateral classification, let us take a step back to 1982 and assess two conceivable predictions about the commercial whaling ban, given the categorization of the IWC. If we assumed that the IWC is a hard multilateral organization, the passage of the whaling ban should have been a function of state consensus, where states voted independently. Similarly, the probability of the ban being overturned in future years would be also be function of states’ independent preferences. Conversely, if we assumed that the IWC is a soft multilateral organization, the passage of the whaling ban could have been a function of reciprocal bilateralism and multilateral consensus such that some states’ votes were not independent of other exogenous factors. As for the probability that the ban be overturned in future years, we would have predicted a much stronger likelihood under this assumption, given that states could engage in reciprocal bilateralism to advance their collective interests i.e. a resumption of whaling in the one case, and material gain in the other.

This study shows the relative accuracy of the predictions that would have been generated under the latter assumption. Thus, we find that the IWC is best categorized not simply as a multilateral organization, the alternative of which is a bilateral organization, but rather a soft-multilateral organization.

5. Conclusion and Policy Implications

This paper has proposed a new categorization of international organizations to account for the fact that, within a multilateral institution, states may engage in
reciprocal-bilateral opportunism in order to advance their policy preferences. The advantage of this approach is twofold. First, the possibility that states are relying increasingly upon IGOs and IOs to advance their goals, while simultaneously engaging in enticement strategies within them suggests that our theoretical expectations for multilateral outcomes may be somewhat flawed. Second, the data and findings from the small group of papers that study “enticement” in IGOs confirm what our paper has found—that states may deviate from their general models of aid relationships in order to advance their interests within an IGO. Given the evidence that foreign aid can be used to advance the preferences of donor states in soft-multilateral organizations, an important research extension is to test alternative methods of “enticement,” i.e. opportunism by both donor and recipient nations. Indeed, it may take many more forms, including but certainly not limited to promises of FDI, portfolio or capital investment, investment in infrastructure, or preferable trade arrangements. An aggregation of such studies for a wide variety of organizations would give great insight as to the prevalence of reciprocal-bilateral opportunism in interstate relations in IGOs, and the degree to which multilateral organizations are soft vs. hard.

Secondly, the paper employed an empirical analysis that is substantively different than the models presented in similar papers. Our model is inspired by the gravity model of international trade, and is useful for both specification reasons, and isolating the variables of interest in our study. We suggest it as a useful model for examining enticement in closed membership organizations, and find it especially well suited for the analysis of open membership organizations where soft multilateralism may be a function of both member recruitment and vote buying.

Lastly, the paper contributed to a small, but quickly growing literature on the case of Japan and the IWC. Our findings are in line with Miller and Dolsåk (2007) and Strand et al. 2008, but our analysis is wider in scope, both in terms of years studied and countries included. We conclude that while Japan’s aid may be a function of IWC interactions and the attempt to recruit members or buy votes, overall, the policy is still largely driven by traditional development concerns.
REFERENCES


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