They Come to Play: Supply Effects in an Economic Experiment

by

Jeffrey Carpenter
Allison Liati
Brian Vickery

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MIDDLEBURY, VERMONT 05753

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They Come to Play: Supply effects in an economic experiment

Jeffrey Carpenter† Allison Liati‡ Brian Vickery§

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Abstract

Our experiment challenges the standard, social preference, interpretation of choices in the double blind dictator game. In our bilateral treatment both groups are endowed with $20, any fraction of which can be passed to a randomly determined player in the other group. Because both groups have $20 to start, neither inequality aversion nor altruism should motivate people to give. Despite this, the allocations in this treatment are identical to our replication of the standard double blind game implying that altruism might be the wrong interpretation of giving. Instead, we hypothesize that giving might be driven by participants coming to the lab ready “to play.” The fact that there is a strong correlation between participant responses to an attention deficit, hyperactivity disorder questionnaire and both the rate and level of giving provides direct support for this hypothesis. We also show that having players earn their endowments attenuates the bias.

Keywords: experiment, social preference, altruism, dictator game, impulsivity, demand effect

JEL Code: C91

1 Introduction

Psychologists have worried about “demand effects” since the Hawthorne experiments in the 1920s and 1930s in which the investigators realized that much of the change in productivity of the young women at a Western Electric assembly plant was related to the simple fact that they were participating in an experiment (oethlisberger and Dickson (1939). Since then demand effects in psychology have been associated with people under examination seeing themselves as research assistants who (mostly) want to help the experimenters. These junior research assistants try to figure out what the experiment is about and act in ways that confirm hypotheses. In the Hawthorne study, it was obvious that the researchers were looking for the

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†Department of Economics, Middlebury College; IZA; jpc@middlebury.edu.
‡Department of Economics, Middlebury College; aliat@middlebury.edu.
§Department of Economics, Middlebury College; bvickery@middlebury.edu.
determinants of productivity and the participants did what they could to help even if they did not always guess correctly on the sign of the comparative static: in one illumination study the investigators recorded stable productivity even as the amount of light on the shop floor was reduced to “an amount equal to that on an ordinary moonlight night” (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939:17).

Economists believe that they have attenuated this sort of demand effect by paying people in experiments based on the actions that they take. At a minimum, pay for performance in economic experiments increases the cost to participants for acting contrary to their material incentives. However, economists worry about a slightly different demand effect that may still bias behavior even after we make it costly to behave as junior research assistants. Economists worry that participants view their experience in the lab as a potentially repeated game and that the probability of playing the next stage (and making more money) depends on how one plays in the current stage (Hoffman et al., 1996). If you are a “nice” player today, you will be more likely to be invited back to play again. This sort of demand effect explains why economists began running “double blind” experiments in which players knew that they could never be identified and so there was no point in investing in a reputation as a nice player.

Economists now appear confident that they have eliminated demand effects by paying for performance and by using double blind procedures. However, we have uncovered another bias that is particularly insidious because it is more likely to be present in experiments that, on first reading, seem clever and clean. An example using one of the most common economic experiments, the dictator game (DG), makes the point. In the typical DG one player, the dictator, is given an amount of money and told that she can send as much as she wants to another anonymous participant, the recipient, and keep the rest. Clearly there is no incentive for a selfish person to send anything, so giving money is often interpreted as a measure of social preference – specifically altruism – although giving has also been interpreted as demonstrating inequality aversion. These interpretations may have been premature because early versions of the dictator game were often tainted by demand effects. For example, the DGs reported on in Forsythe et al. (1994) were conducted single blind and in one treatment the payoffs were purposely hypothetical to test for the psychological notion of a demand effect. Indeed, both biases seem to be present because Forsythe et al. found significantly more fairness in the hypothetical DG and Hoffman et al. (1996) (HMcS) showed that offers are considerable smaller in the double blind DG. While offers fall when the stakes are real and the experiment is conducted double blind, approximately one third of the people in HMcS’s experiment still allocated some money to the recipient. The question is whether the behavior of this residual third can be attributed to altruism or is something else at work?

Put yourself in the role of the dictator in a double blind DG played for real stakes. You understand the instructions (it doesn’t get much more straightforward), you understand that there is a one-for-one tradeoff between sending and keeping money, and you understand (and hopefully believe) that there is no way for the experimenter to identify what you have done. So why would you send any money? Maybe you do feel altruistic towards your partner, but why? You are both very likely to be college students which means you are both also likely to be relatively affluent and even if you did want to donate money to someone who might really need it, you can’t do so for sure because your donation will be randomly assigned to someone in the other room. Alternatively, you might be inequality averse Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) and therefore you may want to rectify the fact that you were given money and the recipient was not. However, if you are that concerned with inequality, why would you not consider the inequality in personal wealth among all the participants in the session? If you use cues to assess where you are in the participant income distribution, you could easily find yourself in a situation in which you should give away all the money, but this almost never happens.

So why then do you send money? Our research suggests that people may send money in the DG just because they came to the experiment intent on “playing.” That is, because they invested the time responding to recruiters and getting to the lab, they want to do something and find it very hard to do the equivalent of nothing, in this case to keep all the money. In fact, our data suggests that after employing the standard procedures to eliminate demand effects, the remaining third of our participants may allocate money to the recipient because they come to play not because they are altruistic.

How can we separate social preference reasons for giving from “coming to play” reasons? After replicating the results of HMcS, we conducted a second treatment that we call the bilateral dictator game (BDG) in which both players are given a $20 endowment. Think about giving in this game. Before, the myopic dictator might have focused on game wealth (and disregarded possible differences in overall wealth) and felt altruistic towards the recipient. But, in the bilateral game there is no reason to feel altruistic; all the other players are as well off as you are. There is also no reason for someone sensitive to inequality to give. In fact, inequality aversion suggests that you do not give because then you will just increase your chances of being worse off than the recipient. The BDG played double blind eliminates all the standard reasons for giving in the DG. What is left might be that people come to play.

One striking feature of our data is that when we compare the distribution of allocations in our BDG to our replication of HMcS, we find no difference. Neither the central tendency of the distributions nor the incidence of giving is different. This suggests that the context-free double blind DG played between college students in the lab is not much of a measure of social preference. However, it might be a pretty good measure of impulsivity. To directly test this alternative, in our post-experiment survey we had our participants respond to a standard attention deficit, hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) questionnaire. Using factor analysis to summarize the 45 question scale, our measure of ADHD predicts both sending money and the amount sent at better than the 5% level of confidence. This result was surprising but it provides further evidence that people come to the lab ready to play and it is very hard for some of them to keep a grip on their impulses.

All is not lost, however. We also show how another, less common, experimental manipulation cuts the incidence of impulsivity in half. In a third treatment we have our participants stuff envelopes to earn their endowments. Similar to Cherry et al. (2002), we find that the rate of sending money falls to less than 20% and only one person sends more than a dollar when dictators earn their endowments.

The remainder of the paper provides the details of our research. In the next section we describe our experimental procedures. In section 3 we discuss the distribution of behavior in our three treatments compared to the data from HMcS. In section 4 we show that our results are robust to the inclusion of a number of demographic factors that could affect behavior, including our measure of ADHD. In the last section we discuss the implications of
2 Experimental Design

Altogether, we conducted three double blind DGs with a total of 134 Middlebury College students. In each case participants were randomly sorted into two groups who made decisions simultaneously and independently. To connect our research to the literature, we began by replicating the double blind conditions of HMcS. In this treatment, which we call our replication, we used instructions based on Forsythe et al. (1994) but updated the stakes to $20.\textsuperscript{1} There were 46 participants (23 observations) in this treatment. In our second experiment, the BDG, we eliminated all the social preference reasons for giving money by allocating players in both groups a $20 endowment and by allowing players in both groups to pass money. This design is similar to Ben-Ner and Putterman (2004) with a few important differences: allocation decisions happened simultaneously, not sequentially and there was essentially no possibility of reciprocity because each participant’s allocation was randomly given to a person in the other group. There were 48 participants and observations in this treatment.

The protocol of the BDG is representative. The instructions were handed out and read aloud while all the participants were in the same room. To answer the few questions that arose, the experimenters simply reiterated the appropriate passage from the text. Participants were then randomly sorted into two groups and the groups were taken to different large classrooms. One at a time, participants were given an opaque envelope containing $20 in cash and a slip with a participant number. They were then told to go to an adjoining room where they were to privately remove any money that they did not want to pass to someone in the other room along with the slip containing their participant number. To assure anonymity, they were told to not show their participant number to anyone, including the monitors. On the way back into the room, they deposited their envelopes into a large box. Before they returned to their seats, they were given a survey to fill out as the other participants made their choices. The last part of the survey was to fill out an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) scale borrowed from Young (2004).\textsuperscript{2} When everyone was finished, the box containing the allocations was brought into the hall where the transfers were recorded (the participant numbers were written on the inside flap of the envelopes). After everyone was done with the survey, the boxes were brought to the opposite room and the participants were randomly assigned envelopes as they left. Unless a player revealed his or her participant number, there would be no way to match individuals with their behavior. In this sense each treatment was double blind anonymous.

In the last, earned endowment, treatment, 40 participants performed a real effort task to earn their endowments before they took part in the BDG. The production task was to fold, staple, and address flyers that would be sent via campus mail to other Middlebury students. To keep interactions among the participants to a minimum, production was done individually and in silence. To prevent income effects, each participant received a flat rate of $20 for a half hour of work. The production task was completely separate from the BDG in that no

\textsuperscript{1}Sample instructions appear in the appendix.

\textsuperscript{2}This scale also appears in the appendix.
mention of the BDG was made until after the production task was finished. Further, the production task began after randomly splitting the participants into two groups to minimize any interactions among the potential dictators and recipients.

The full Young (2004) ADHD scale is composed of 112 questions scored on a 5-point Likert scale varying from “never” to “most of the time.” We implemented the 45 question abridged version used to diagnose ADHD. This scale includes 25 items that relate to inattention, 11 items that relate to impulsivity, and 9 items relating to hyperactivity. As in Young (2004), we summarize the responses of our participants by calculating the factor loadings on the 45 items. In our implementation, the five items that were assigned the highest scores were Q3 Have you been inattentive, easily distracted, Q5 Have you had difficulty sustaining attention, Q10 Have you been reluctant to do tasks that require sustained mental effort, Q15 Have you fidgeted with your hands or feet, or squirmed in your seat, and Q24 Have you had difficulty concentrating? These five items also received relatively large scores in Young’s implementation.

3 Data Overview

The pooled data from our experiment is summarized in Table 1. The mean allocation was less than a dollar (77 cents to be exact), however the allocation ranged from nothing to $10 which was half the initial endowment. As another measure of behavior, 30% of our participants sent at least one dollar. The remaining rows in Table 1 provide summary statistics from our survey. The average participant was 20.59 years old, had a grade point average of 3.43 and 1.35 siblings. Thirty-nine percent of our participants were female, 57% percent were first born, 56% were economics majors, and 55% worked part time during the school year. As for the ADHD scale, we report the orthogonal varimax rotation resulting from a factor analysis of the 45 questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount Sent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade Point Average (GPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined SAT Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Siblings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Part Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADHD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To illustrate the behavioral differences in our experiment, Figure 1 presents histograms of the allocations by treatment. We report two statistics to be comprehensive in our analysis of
any differences in the distribution of allocations. We report Wilcoxon rank sum statistics (z) to examine differences in the central tendency of the allocations and Fisher exact chi-squared statistics (χ²) to test for differences in the incidences of allocating a positive amount. There are actually four histograms in Figure 1 because we also reproduce the HMcS double blind data in the upper left cell to demonstrate the extent to which we were able to replicate their results. In fact, our replication seen in the upper right cell was nearly perfect (z = −0.56, p = 0.57; χ² = 0.08, p = 0.81).

Interestingly, there also does not appear to be any significant difference between our double blind replication of HMcS and our double blind BDG (z = 0.02, p = 0.98; χ² = 0.05, p > 0.99). The implications of this result are considerable. Given we have removed the social preference reasons for giving money in the BDG, it appears that “coming to play” is a better explanation of allocations in both the BDG and the regular DG. For that matter, because we have replicated HMcS so well, the allocations in their experiment might also have been due to impulsivity. Based on our results, one can make the case that once we have controlled for both psychological and economic demand effects in the lab, what is left over is actually the impulsive need to act when supplied a stimulus, not altruism.

The good news, however, is that we have also discovered a viable way to remove much of the impulsivity from the experiment. Comparing across the bottom two cells of Figure 1, we see that having participants earn their endowments reduces the incidence of giving to 17% (from 38%) and removes all but one allocation larger than a dollar. Based on our two tests, earning one’s endowment significantly reduces impulsivity (z = −2.27, p = 0.02; χ² = 6.47, p = 0.03).
4 Data Analysis

Another way to make our analysis comprehensive is to control for a collection of other demographic factors that might affect allocation decisions and to examine both the level of giving and the incidence of giving. For example, Eckel and Grossman (1998) find that women in double blind dictator games give away approximately twice as much money as men. With our lengthy exit survey we can account for the effects of dictator sex and all the other variables listed in Table 1, including our ADHD measure in which we have a particularly interest because it allows us to directly link “coming to play” with impulsivity.

Because allocations are bounded from below we use the Tobit regressor to test the robust-ness of our treatment differences in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2. Starting with column (1) we see that the differences between the BDG and our replication (the omitted treatment) and between the BDG and our earned endowment treatment are robust to the inclusion of the demographics, even though many of the demographics matter. The coefficient on the BDG is small and insignificant confirming that there is no difference between behavior in the BDG and our replication of HMCS. At the same time, the coefficient on the earned endowment treatment is large, negative and significant ($p = 0.04$) indicating that participants who earn their endowments tend to give away $2.59 less than in our replication. This important test, however, is whether the BDG and the earned endowment point estimates are different. The chi-squared test suggests that they are ($p = 0.03$): participants give away significantly less money when they have to earn their endowments in the BDG. Column (1) also demonstrates that a standard deviation increase in grade point average reduces allocations by $1.53, and older students give away more, an additional 77 cents per year of schooling. Lastly, we replicate Eckel and Grossman: our female participants gave away $2.28 more than our male participants. Considering that the average allocation was $0.77, the female-male difference is considerable.

In column (2) of Table 2 we add our measure of ADHD to the analysis of dictator allocations. Other than affecting slight changes in the point estimates, adding the ADHD measure leaves the results of column (1) unchanged. Nevertheless, allocations are highly correlated with our ADHD measure: a standard deviation increase in ADHD increases the dictator’s allocation by $1.42. This result provides direct evidence that more impulsive participants give away significantly more money in the DG. It is also interesting that the effect of im-pulsivity is not treatment specific. For example, the ordering of the treatment coefficients remains the same (the BDG and earned endowment BDG comparison is significant at the 7% level) and the coefficient on the (unreported) interactions of ADHD with treatment are never significantly different from zero.

All the results from our analysis of the amount allocated by the dictators remain when we use the probit estimator (with robust standard errors) to examine the incidence of giving instead. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 we see that participants in the BDG are no more or less likely to given compared to our replication of HMcS but when they have to earn their endowments they are approximately 20% less likely to give. The demographics suggest that participants with higher GPAs are less likely to give, older students are more likely to give, and women are 20% more likely to give than men. That said the important result is that participants that measure high in ADHD do not just give more money away, they are also
more likely to give. A standard deviation increase in impulsivity predicts a 10% increase in the likelihood of giving.

### Table 2: The Determinants of Sending and Allocations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable is Amount Sent</th>
<th>Dependent Variable is 1 if Amount Sent &gt; 0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[1] (1.17) 0.22</td>
<td>[3] (0.11) -0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>[4] (0.12) -0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earned Endowment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2.59 (1.06)</td>
<td>-0.20 (0.11) -0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-5.29 (1.13)</td>
<td>-0.62 (0.11) -0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAT Score (hundreds)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.70 (0.50) 0.30</td>
<td>0.05 (0.50) 0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.28 (0.43) 1.82</td>
<td>0.20 (0.40) 0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Siblings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.66 (0.43) 0.42</td>
<td>0.03 (0.40) 0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Born</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.15 (0.95) 0.60</td>
<td>0.13 (0.90) 0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.77 (0.42) 0.35</td>
<td>0.09 (0.39) 0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics Major</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1.38 (0.96) -0.60</td>
<td>-0.14 (0.91) -0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Part Time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99 (0.91) 0.66</td>
<td>0.09 (0.83) 0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADHD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.62 (0.53)</td>
<td>0.12 (0.05) 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-10.10 (11.38) -12.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * indicates significant at the 10% level, ** 5%, *** 1%. Columns [1] and [2] are the results of tobit regressions censored at zero. Columns [3] and [4] report the marginal effects from probit regressions with robust standard errors.

5 Discussion

We conduct an experiment that challenges the standard, social preference, interpretation of choices in the double blind DG. In our bilateral treatment both groups of participants are

3In both cases the BDG and earned endowment BDG coefficients are significantly different at the 10% level or better, even though the earned endowment coefficient is itself not significant in column (4).

4Again, neither of the impulsivity – treatment interactions are significant.
endowed with $20, any fraction of which they can pass to a randomly determined player in the other group. Because both groups have $20 to start, neither inequality aversion nor altruism should motivate people to give. Despite this, the allocations in this treatment are identical to our replication of the standard double DG implying that altruism might be the wrong interpretation of giving in the DG. Instead, we hypothesize that giving in the double blind DG might be driven by participants coming to the lab ready “to play.” The fact that there is a strong correlation between participant responses to an attention deficit, hyperactivity disorder questionnaire and both the rate and level of giving provides direct support for this hypothesis. Specifically, we find that participants who score higher on the ADHD scale are significantly more likely to give and give significantly more. While it is likely that “coming to play” biases our interpretation of behavior in games like the DG, we also show in a third treatment that having participants earn their endowments reduces the amount of “coming to play” substantially. As a practical matter, earned endowments should probably become more common.

While the case for impulsive behavior in the DG is strong, we also think that the degree to which impulsivity or “coming to play” matters in the DG depends on the protocol, specifically the context in which the recipient is portrayed – is there a reason to give? Compared to the double blind DG conducted in the sterile lab between students, the protocol of Eckel and Grossman (1996) in which students make donations to the Red Cross seems more likely to create an environment in which altruism displaces impulsivity, at least to some degree. Similarly, the protocol of Fong (2005) in which the recipients were demonstrably poor or the fact that Benz and Meier (2005) find some correlation between lab giving and giving in the real world give us more confidence that they are measuring differences in social preference.

The problem of “coming to play” surely affects behavior in other context-poor lab experiments. For example, the third party punishment version of the DG run by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) in which there is a third participant whose job is to monitor and punish the dictator based on how much she gives to the second party might overstate the likelihood of third party intervention because the only way the third party can participate is by punishing the dictator. Fehr and Fischbacher report a 60% rate of intervention but in a social dilemma setting in which third parties also made contributions to a public good, Carpenter and Matthews (2005) report an intervention rate of only 10%. In general, we think that people should be wary of experiments that seem too “clean” if the cleanliness comes from severe restrictions in the ways in which people participate. Another way of putting this is that economic experiments may be the only domain in which Say’s law (the colloquial version) applies. Simply supplying choices to subjects in experiments may create a demand for behavior if that behavior is the only way to participate. Instead of demand effects, experimenters might start worrying about “supply effects.”

6 Appendix – Experimental instructions in the bilateral and earned endowment treatments and the ADHD scale (borrowed from Young, 2004)

INSTRUCTIONS
PAYMENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY

You have been asked to participate in an economics experiment. For your participation today you will receive an amount of money that will depend on the decisions participants make in the experiment. This amount will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.

Today’s experiment will be conducted according to a double-blind protocol. This means that no one (including the other participants and the people conducting the experiment) will ever be able to match your decisions to you specifically. In this experiment each of you will be randomly paired with another person. You will not be told who this person is and the other person will not be told who you are, either during or after the experiment.

THE EXPERIMENT

After we finish reading the instructions together, you will be randomly split into two groups, group A and group B. The groups will be separated, and each of the participants will start with an envelope containing $20 in cash. [Earned endowment: This $20 is the money you earned during the first stage of the experiment.] When called on, a participant will go into the adjoining room alone to decide how much of this $20 (s)he wants to transfer to someone at random in the other group. Each of you will make this decision without knowing how much you will receive from the other group. When both groups are finished, you will receive an envelop containing the amount transferred to you from someone in the other group.

Your final payment will be:
$20 - amount you transfer + amount transferred to you.

Let’s now go through the procedures in more detail. At the beginning of the experiment everyone will receive an opaque envelope containing $20 in cash and a slip of paper that has your participant number written on it. To protect your anonymity, do not reveal this number to anyone (even the people running the experiment). When called on you will go to the adjoining room to privately make your choice of how much money to transfer to someone in the other group. Remove from the envelope the amount of money that you want to keep. Any money left in the envelope will be transferred to the other participant. After making your decision you will place your envelop in the box near the front of the room.

When you have made your decision you will be given a survey to fill out while the other participants make their decisions. Write your participant number on the top of the survey, fill out the survey, and then place it back in the opaque envelope that it came in. Your participant number will link your survey responses to your envelope, but nobody (including the people running the experiment) will ever be able to link you to your participant number.

After everyone has finished allocating money, the people running the experiment will take the two boxes (one from each group) that contain the opaque envelopes into the hall to record the amounts transferred. They will then bring the box from group A to group B and vice-versa. One at a time each participant will then go to the front of the room to randomly receive an envelope from the other group and turn in his or her survey.

Are there any questions?

ADHD SCALE

For the following statements, please circle the response that best fits.

Never (1) Sometimes (3) Most of the time (5)
1. Have you failed to finish things you have started?
2. Have you been constantly fidgeting?
3. Have you been inattentive, easily distracted?
4. Have you made careless mistakes in your work or activities?
5. Have you had difficulty sustaining attention?
6. Have you not listened when people spoke to you directly?
7. Have you not understood instructions?
8. Have you had difficulty organizing tasks and activities?
9. Have you avoided tasks that require sustained mental effort?
10. Have you been reluctant to do tasks that require sustained mental effort?
11. Have you disliked doing tasks requiring sustained mental effort?
12. Have you lost items necessary for tasks or activities?
13. Have you been distracted by events happening around you?
14. Have you been forgetful in daily activities?
15. Have you fidgeted with your hands or squirmed in your seat?
16. Have you left your seat in situations where remaining seated is expected (e.g. in the cinema)
17. Have you had difficulty with quiet leisure activities?
18. Have you felt ‘on the go’ or often acted as if driven by a motor?
19. Have you talked excessively?
20. Have you blurted out answers before questions have been completed?
21. Have you had difficulty waiting your turn?
22. Have you interrupted or intruded on others?
23. Have you daydreamed?
24. Have you had difficulty concentrating?
25. Have you engaged in attention seeking behavior?
26. Have you lacked caution and acted in a dare-devilish way?
27. Have you felt as if you can’t be bothered?
28. Have you felt bored and disinterested?
29. Have you been neat, tidy and organized?
30. Have you acted without thinking?
31. Have you behaved in a childish way?
32. Have you been able to sit comfortably through a movie or TV show?
33. Have you been able to remain seated at the dinner table?
34. Have you felt as though you were over-excited, as if you were ‘flying’ or going too fast?
35. Have you planned things ahead of time?
36. Have you had difficulty scheduling things on time?
37. Have you been late for appointments?
38. Have you jumped from task to task without finishing the first?
39. Have you put off difficult projects?
40. Have you procrastinated and complained?
41. Have you spoken out before thinking?
42. Have you made impetuous decisions?
43. Have you acted without thinking (e.g., impulse buying)?
44. Have you sought out excessive excitement and thrills?
45. Have you been able to focus on tasks and activities when necessary?

7 References


