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Teams exploit their monopoly power by forcing cities to buy more games than would be dictated by the conventional monopoly model. Leeds and von Allmen [*The Economics of Sports* (2002), p. 164] note: "Since the city cannot choose to host a franchise for a smaller part of a season at a lower price, it must pay the full price or have no franchise at all." The city's residents nonetheless enjoy a surplus so long as the city buys all the games (Q_m) dictated by the demand curve at the monopoly price (p_m).

If, however, teams confront cities with an all-or-nothing choice, they can induce cities to host more than Q_m games. Such action results in a loss of consumer surplus. When does this loss offset the city's initial consumer surplus? If games are produced under conditions of constant cost and the demand schedule for games is a straight line over the relevant range, the size of the loss catches up with the size of the surplus when the city is forced to host $2Q_m$ games. Moreover, it can be shown that the loss is equal to one-half of the city's outlay ($p_m \cdot Q_m$) divided by their elasticity of demand for games.